Alvin Plantinga[1] proposed an account of justification (he prefers the word “warrant”) which he believes to be the correct account. Responses to his account have produced several Gettier type counter-examples which appear to defeat his account. Plantinga[2] conceded these examples by purposing several amendments to his definition of warrant in order to get around these counter-examples. Thomas Crisp[3] argued there are problems with these amendments which make them incapable of getting around the Gettier type counter-examples they were meant to deal with. Crisp also proposes his own amendments to Plantinga’s account of warrant which he believes works better when dealing with Gettier-style counter-examples. I argue that Crisp’s proposed amendments also fails given another Gettier type counter-example.
This paper has three parts. First, a very brief summary of Plantinga’s account of warrant and the scenario that creates a problem for his account. Next will be Crisp’s critique of Plantinga’s solution and his own solution to the problem. Finally, I will offer a scenario that is a counter-example to Crisp’s amendments.
II. Relevant parts of Plantinga’s account of Warrant and where it fails
Plantinga argues that warrant comes in degrees. One can have some warrant for false beliefs, but if an agent has enough warrant then one has knowledge. This differs from something like a view of justification that allows for an agent to have a lot of justification for a belief, but if the belief is false then it isn’t knowledge. Plantinga rejects this notion of justification; an agent cannot have enough warrant for knowledge and not have knowledge. In order for the agent to gain enough warrant for knowledge it has to be done by properly functioning processes of the epistemic agent within a favorable cognitive environment. For the purposes of this paper, the only important part is the “favorable cognitive environment.”
There are Gettier-style scenarios where Plantinga’s account of warrant is unsuccessful at getting the desired result. Consider the following scenario[4]: Jack attends a Fighting Irish football game. Jack arrives at the game in his Chevrolet van. Jack parks in one of the football coaches’ spots. The players, not wanting to let this act go unpunished arrange to have Jack’s truck towed from the parking lot and crushed into a cube shortly after he leaves his vehicle. Unbeknownst to Jack, he has won a contest which will be announced during the game and the prize is a Chevrolet van. He spots a friend on the way to his seat and his friend happens to ask him what vehicle he owns. Jack responds, “I own a Chevrolet van.” Such a belief is true, but it is only accidently true. Consider a very similar counter-factual scenario where the players tow the van, but don’t destroy it. Such a counterfactual intuitively appears to maintained knowledge for Jack.
Given Plantinga’s account of warrant, either both scenarios are instances of knowledge or neither are instances of knowledge because the
“…belief is produced by the very same cognitive processes functioning the very same way in the same favorable cognitive environment. Hence, … either both of these situations in which [Jack] know[s] that [Jack] own[s] a Chevrolet van, or neither is.”[5]
Obviously, Plantinga wants to be able to reject this conclusion within his account of warrant. There doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with the agent’s cognitive processes in either scenario so Plantinga rejects the idea that the environment is cognitively favorable.
In order to avoid the destroyed van scenario, Plantinga introduces the notion of a “mini-environment” and offers a new definition of “favorability”.
Plantinga defines “mini-environment” (ME) as:
(CME) a state of affairs A is a mini-environment with respect to exercise E of cognitive power in maximally specific epistemic circumstances C =df (i) A is properly included in C, and (ii) A is as much as possible like C given that A entails neither the proposition that E yields true belief nor its denial.[6]
Plantinga defines “favorable” as:
(F) a cognitive mini-environment is favourable with respect to a particular exercise E of S’s cognitive powers if and only if, if S were to form a belief by way of E in this mini-environment.[7]
Given (CME) and (F) Plantinga concludes that:
(RC) A belief B produced by an exercise E of cognitive powers in a cognitive mini-environment ME has warrant (sufficient for knowledge) only if ME is favourable for E.[8]
Plantinga maintains that (CME), (F), and (RC) will allow his account of warrant to avoid the destroyed van scenario. The destroyed van scenario is an ME that is unfavorable for E therefore the belief B is not warranted and so does not qualify as knowledge.
III. Crisp’s definition of Favorable Mini-environments
Crisp argues that Plantinga’s amendments will not get the desired result. Crisp notices within the destroyed van scenario there are two issues and only one of these issues is addressed by (CME), (F), and (RC). The first issue is that Jack’s belief lacks a kind of general favorability because it is an accidently true belief. The other issue is that the scenario is very close to a counterfactual possible world where Jack has knowledge so Jack’s belief also lacks counterfactual favorability. Plantinga’s amendments only focus on the counterfactual favorability. Applying (CME), (F), and (RC) produce the undesirable result; if a scenario is counterfactually favorable then that scenario will not be accidently true.
In order to illustrate the above point, Crisp offers a scenario that is counterfactually favorable but still an accidently true belief. Consider the scenario where a small town has a monthly, “Guess the number of prunes in the jar” contest. You are a citizen of this town and your uncle runs the contest. You have a friend and he tells you that there are 138 prunes in the jar this month. He got the information from someone who works for your uncle but the information is faulty. Your uncle comes down with an odd brain disease which causes him to think there will be a major disaster if you don’t win this months contest. What your uncle does is no matter what number you write down, he will empty the jar of prunes and place that number of prunes in the jar. Your belief is true, but it is true by accident. Your belief is a counterfactually favorable because no matter the number of prunes you guess are in the jar, your uncle will put that number of prunes in the jar.
In order to deal with the prune scenario, Crisp offers the following concepts and a definition for an unfavorable mini-environment:
…‘P(p/q)’ short for ‘the epistemic probability of p given q.
…q confirms p for some S iff P(p/q & k) > (p/k), where k is the conjunction of S’s background beliefs. And say that a proposition p defeats a belief b for S iff P(b/ p & k) < P(b/k) and P(b/ p & k) < n, where n is some real number representing the point at which a human being with properly functioning faculties would cease to believe that b. Finally, say that p is an undefeated defeator of b for S iff p defeats b for S and there is no true proposition q such that (i) q defeats neither b nor not-b for S, and (ii) P(b/ p & q & k) > n.
(U) ME is an unfavorable mini-environment for exercise E of S’s cognitive power resulting in the belief that b =df there are propositions p and q, neither of which are believed by S, such that
(a) ME entails not-p and q, and
(b) P(p/k) > P(q/k), and
(c) both p and q confirm b for S, and
(d) not-p is an undefeated defeator of b for S and not-q does not defeat b for S.[9]
These definitions give Crisp the desired result that the destroyed van scenario and the prune scenario are unfavorable scenarios.
b = ‘I (Jones) owns a Chevy van.’
p = ‘It is not the case that my van has been destroyed.’
q = ‘I won the van contest’[10]
and
b = ‘The jar contains 138 prunes’.
p = ‘It is not the case that the number of prunes has changed since you submitted your contest entry.’
q = ‘Your uncle placed 138 prunes in the jar because you guessed there were 138 prunes’[11]
Given these desirable results, Crisp goes on to define favorability with respect to the definition of unfavorability.
(F¢) ME is favorable for exercise E of S’s cognitive powers =df ME is not unfavorable for E.[12]
IV. A Counter-example to Crisp’s definition of favorability
Let us consider a slightly modified scenario that has been the source of discussion for many logicians[13]. We have a student, Jane, who is a logic student. On a Monday the professor makes the following announcement to the class, “There will be an exam this week and you will be surprised on the day we take it.” Monday night, Jane decides to work out the implications of what the professor just said.
She supposes the test might be on Friday. If the test has not been given by Thursday then she will know that the test will be on Friday. Hence she cannot be surprised if the test is on Friday. Hence the test cannot be on Friday since she will not be surprised. She has ruled out the possibility that the test is going to be on Friday. The same steps can be used for the remaining days of the week so she concludes there is no way the professor uttered a true proposition. Having ruled out Friday she considers Thursday. If they get till Wednesday and she hasn’t received the test then she will not be surprised that it is on Thursday. Hence, the test cannot be on Thursday. Such reasoning allows her to rule out all the days of the week so she forms the belief that there will be no test that week.
The professor did not realize the logical implications of her utterance and she decides to administer the test on Wednesday. Unfortunately, the professor catches a serious flu Monday night and is not able to prepare a test for any day that week. Jane’s belief is true, but it is purely by accident. Had the professor not caught the flu, her belief would have been false. Consider this second scenario: There is a close possible world where the professor happens to check the logical implications of her utterance and realized she should not give them a test that week. She still gets the flu but since she was not going to give the students a test anyways, Jane’s belief seems to count as knowledge.
With the following scenario let us consider Crisp’s definition of an unfavorable mini-environment. Our b, p, and q will be as follows:
b = I (Jane) will not have a test this week.
p = Jane’s professor did not check the logical implications of her utterance.
q = The professor caught a serious flu Monday night.
We will only need to be concerned with Crisp’s condition (a) (ME entails not-p and q). Since the mini-environment of the first scenario entails p it does not satisfy the (a) condition. Since condition (a) is not satisfied then the definition (U) is not satisfied. Given the fact that (U) is not satisfied then given the definition of (F¢) we can conclude that the ME in the first scenario is a favorable mini-environment yet the original problem is still present. In both scenarios, Jane’s belief is produced by the very same processes functioning the very same way in the same favorable cognitive environment. The belief from the first and second scenarios has to count as knowledge or neither can count as knowledge, given Plantinga’s account of warrant. Also, Crisp’s concepts and definitions fail to get the desired result within the first scenario since Jane has the true belief that is only true by accident and yet satisfies his favorability requirement.
References
Crisp, Thomas M. “Gettier and Plantinga’s revised account of warrant.” Analysis Volume
60, Number 1, January 2000, p. 42-50
Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 1963, p. 121-23
Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK
1993a
Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Proper Function. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK
1993b
Plantinga, Alvin. “Respondeo.” In Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in
Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Editor). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Lanham, Maryland 1996 p. 307-378
Plantinga, Alvin. “Warrant and Accidentally True Belief.” Analysis Volume 57, Number
2 April 1997, p. 140-145
Smullyan, Raymond 1987. Forever Undecided. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Press NY
January 2000, p. 42-50 and Plantinga (1997) p. 141-142
[4] Crisp (2000) p. 42
[5] Plantinga (1997) p. 142
[6] Plantinga (1996) p. 315
[7] Plantinga (1997) p. 144
[8] Plantinga (1997) p. 144
[9] Crisp (2000) p. 48
[10] Crisp (2000) p. 49
[11] Crisp (2000) p. 49
[12] Crisp (2000) p. 49
p. 8-11 for a brief discussion of this problem.
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